In spite of what is commonly believed, we will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed non-trivially so), and that the principles are jointly satisfied if and only if rational belief is equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. This paper develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. I close by indicating how this view might be developed and suggest that is may have important implications for the philosophies of mind and action. I then review different versions of this view and argue for the superiority of what I call the premising view, according to which flat-out belief is a disposition to take the believed proposition as a premise in one’s conscious explicit reasoning and decision-making. Actions that manifest a flat-out belief will at the same time manifest the partial beliefs and desires that realize it and may thus be justified by reference to both classical norms and probabilistic ones. Nor is there any conflict of rational norms. Rather, flat-out states are effective in virtue of the underlying partial ones. On this view there is no conflict between the efficacy of flat-out states and that of partial ones.
A better view, I argue, is to think of flat-out beliefs as complex behavioural dispositions that are realized in the agent’s partial beliefs and desires. I review various versions of this suggestion and argue that none is attractive. But how are the two supposed to be related and how can both have a role in guiding rational action,-especially as they are subject to different norms? One response is to argue that the two are not fundamentally distinct-– that one is the core state and the other a derivative. We speak of having both degrees of confidence (or partial beliefs) and flat-out, unqualified beliefs. There is a duality in the folk view of belief.
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